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Abstract: We study the dynamics of exchange value in a system composed of many interacting
agents. The simple model we propose exhibits cooperative emergence and collapse of global value
for individual goods. We demonstrate that the demand that drives the value exhibits non-Gaussian
“fat tails” and typical fluctuations which grow with time interval as ∆tH , with H ∼ 0.7.
PACS numbers: 02.50, 05.10.-a, 05.40.-a, 05.45.-a, 05.65.+b, 05.70.Ln, 87.23.Ge,
89.90.+n
The self organizational patterns of large non-equilibrium systems are of large current
interest. One aspect of such systems is their tendency to display cooperative behavior,
evidenced, for example, in the form of the occasional coordinated activity throughout the
system [1–3]. Economic systems provide examples of such cooperative behavior, that indeed
show some of the characteristics of self organizing systems. More specifically, agents reach
a collective agreement about what should be considered as valuable, and then use it as
a common trade object (money) [4]. Furthermore, the fluctuation of relative value with
time t displays anomalous Hurst exponents (typical ∆D ∝ ∆tH [5] with H > 1/2) [6,7]
and non-Gaussian statistics. The latter fact was first noticed by Mandelbrot [8,9] and later
quantified in the observation that the succession of daily, weekly and monthly distributions
of exchange values possibly converges towards a Gaussian [10,11].
Recently a number of theoretical approaches have been developed to deal either with the
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emergence of money as a cooperative phenomenon, or with the non-Gaussian fluctuations
associated to it. In particular the work of Yasutomi [12] deals with the stochastic nature of
emergence of certain goods as means of common exchange between all the agents, i.e. how
they become money. Yasutomi makes the observation that if agents tends to accept what
others accept, then trade is facilitated. Therefore, emergence of money becomes related to
history dependent processes, which, as discussed by B. Arthur [13] tend to lock the market
into certain trade patterns. This, however does not explain how one popular product may
be replaced by another, and thus result in an open and ever fluctuating system. Yasutomi
suggestion to solve this problem is to include both trade costs and an evolving threshold for
transactions. In this way he obtains a bi-stable system where money emerges and collapses
quasiperiodically. Dealing with the nature of fluctuations alone, Bak, Paczuski and Shubik
suggested a model with only one product, and concluded that non-Gaussian fluctuations
could be associated with the crowding obtained when agents imitate each other’s prize
assessments [14]. They further obtained the anomalous Hurst exponents H = 0.65 in a
scenario where local fluctuations are amplified by the global activity level. Levy, Levy and
Solomon [15] emphasize the effect of heterogeneous expectations for the traders in a stock-
bond market. However, their specific model develops an unrealistic periodicity for large
systems [16]. As we will see, our model self organizes heterogenity in a market where each
agent has its own limited history. Furthermore, it predicts the emergence of non-periodic
but persistent fluctuations in a market where many products compete for attention.
In the present work we suggest a simple model that suggests that emergence of “money”
and its anomalous fluctuation in value are two sides of the same cooperative phenomena.
We suggest that value emerges through agents which make simple decisions based on their
individual memory of earlier encounters with other agents. The agents are not assumed to
be smart, the only trade that occurs is a one-good-for-one-good trade, and agents basically
act in order to keep stock of all products. The model leads to emergence and collapse of
money, it exhibits non-Gaussian statistics and also displays long time fluctuations quantified
by anomalous Hurst exponents.
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The model we propose is as follows. We consider Nag agents and Npr different products.
Initially we give Nunit units of the products to each agent. The number Nunit is fixed, but
the products are chosen at random, so the individuals are not in exactly the same situation.
At each timestep we select two random agents and let them attempt to perform a trade
between them. The trade starts by comparing the list of goods that each agent lacks and
therefore would like to get from the other agent in exchange for goods it has in stock.
We first consider the simple barter exchange procedure: when each of the agents has
products that the other needs, then one of these products, chosen at random, is exchanged.
In case such a barter exchange is not possible we consider the “money” exchange proce-
dure: one or both of the agents accept goods which they do not lack, but consider useful for
future exchanges.
In order to determine the usefulness of a product, each agent i keeps a record of the
last requests for goods it received in encounters with other agents. This memory is finite,
having a length of Nmem positions, each of which registers a product that was requested.
As the memory gets filled, the record of old transactions is lost. Agents accept products
they already have in stock with a probability based on its memory record. The chance of
accepting such a good j is taken to be proportional to the number of times Tij that good j
appears on the memory list of agent i:
pij =
Tij
Nmem
, (1)
where we have used the fact that
∑
j Tij = Nmem. These two exchange mechanisms define
our model.
In order to understand the dynamics of this model we first show, in Fig. 1, the time
evolution of the number of different kinds of trades. The case depicted corresponds to
Nag = 200 agents trading Npr = 200 types of products between them. The memory list of
each agent was chosen to be Nmem = 400 items long and the total “richness” of the economy
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was fixed by setting the numbers of products possessed by each agent to Nunit = 400. This
may be considered a typical set of parameters, and the behavior is similar for a wide range
of number of goods, memory sizes and richness values, as long as memories are not too
short and richness not too high or too small. If the economy is too rich, barter exchange
disappears completely as all agents will always have all types of goods. On the other hand,
if the economy is very poor, barter exchange dominates completely and “money” exchange
does not emerge. Besides, in order for money to appear at all, the memory of each agent
must not be much shorter than the number of different products, Npr, (however, it can be
much smaller than Nag).
Fig. 1 shows that after a relatively short equilibration time the ratio of barter to money
transactions saturates. The fact that money transactions dominate means that the agents
have already distributed their holdings in an efficient way, thus allowing money exchange to
become the dominating mode of transaction. We also notice that the sum of the two types
of exchanges is less than 100% , meaning that approximately 40% of encounters between
agents did not lead to trades, for this set of parameters.
The interesting feature of our model is however not the relative number of these two
types of transactions, but the the fact that some products become valuable as means of
exchange. In order to quantify this we define the monetary value of a good j as the number
of agents M = M(j) that consider this good to be the easiest to trade. In other words, each
agent i indicates the good j with highest pij .
In Fig. 2a,b we show the value of two particular goods as function of time, which here
we measure as number of encounters between agents. Notice that the time scale for the
evolution is a factor 100 larger than that of Fig. 1. This shows that, although the number
of money and barter exchanges has equilibrated almost instantaneously in the timescale of
Fig. 2, the evolution of the value of the goods displays an interesting dynamics on this larger
timescale. In Fig. 2c we have plotted the number of agents that accept the most desirable
good. From comparison with Figs. 2a and 2b, we notice that the good in Fig. 2a becomes
the most accepted in terms of exchange early in the evolution of the system, and remains
4
in that condition until more than 900000 encounters have taken place, in this particular
history. At this point, the good from Fig. 2b takes over, for a briefer period, until time
1200000. There is a couple of additional crossovers between these two products, but at the
end another product arises and takes over as being the most popular.
We stress that an important feature of the model is that often, and over long periods,
one particular good is considered valuable by a majority of the agents. This appears without
any a priori property of this product; the value of the good develops through a cooperative
agreement between the agents about what is valuable.
How is this agreement reached? In our model the agents only transfer information about
what they need to replenish their stocks. Thus the common concept of value emerges when
many agents need a good, e.g. because it is concentrated by some of the agents. This
accumulation is possible in our simple model because an agent accepts goods even when
having them in sufficient stock, if it feels they will be useful for future transactions. This
property in itself makes a desired product to circulate, and possibly concentrate, more than
other goods, thereby making it more needed across the system.
However goods in high demand also collapse, as it was seen at time ≈ 800000 in Fig. 2a.
This is because, due to the large number of money transactions, the most valuable good
may, through random fluctuations, become better distributed than some other good, which
then replaces it as the system’s money.
We now try to quantify these fluctuations. Fig. 3a displays the changes in the value of
M , which time evolution was seen in Fig. 2c, for various time intervals ∆t. The figure shows
that, for sufficiently large values of ∆t, these fluctuations have exponential tails. This is in
contrast to the normal Gaussian behavior expected for value assigned by independent agents.
The fluctuations obtained for the different values of ∆t could not be made to collapse into
one curve. This signals that the short and long time statistics of M cannot be described by
the same Hurst exponent.
In order to examine the statistics of the underlying demand of goods we show, in Fig.3b,
the fluctuations in the number of times D that a given product j appears in the memory of
5
the system,
D(j) =
∑
i
Tij , (2)
where the sum runs over all agents i in the system. In Fig. 3b we show a data collapse
of fluctuations in D, i.e. P (∆D) → ∆tH · P ( ∆D
∆tH
) for 3 different values of ∆t. We notice
that the curves collapse with Hurst exponent H = 0.70, an observation that we confirmed
by finding numerically that (〈(D(t+∆t)−D(t))2〉)
1
2 ∝ ∆t0.68±0.02, over more than three
orders of magnitude. The fact that H > 0.5 indicates that fluctuations in demand exhibit
persistency, i.e. that trends are amplified by a self organized cooperative feedback in our
model. This relatively large anomalous Hurst exponent requires that there is a sizeable
number of different products. We have found that persistence exists for nearly all system
sizes. The value of the Hurst exponent was found to 0.6 for a size 10 system whereas it was
found to be 0.7 for system size 100 and 1000. For size dependence we mean here that we
scale equally the parameters of the model: Nag, Npr, Nmem, Nunit. We have also checked that
a change in Nag alone from 100 to 1000 also leads to a Hurst exponent of 0.7. Only in the
case of Npr = 2 we found H = 0.5, and this for any value of the other parameters.
We further notice, from Fig. 3b, that the fluctuations exhibit fat tails. In particular,
the short time scale statistics tend to have exponential tails whereas the long timescale
fluctuations are more Gaussian-like. The difference of Hurst scaling between value M and
demand D reflects the fact that changes in the most wanted product are faster, but less
persistent than structural changes in the composition of demand.
We have examined variations of the above model, as, for example, including reluctance
for the agents to trade away goods they consider valuable, i.e. with high pij . Also we
have considered the possibility that agents include in Ti only trades that were effectively
performed, and not just requests. Finally, we have tested the case where the Ti lists also
include requests for “money trades”, arising from what other agents consider valuable. All
these cases change the information exchanged between agents about what is valuable. How-
ever, the qualitative behavior of our model was in all cases similar, indicating its robustness.
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It is tempting to compare the emergence of value in the above model with the emergence
of monetary systems in the real world. A beautiful historical example of the collapse of
one currency and the appearance of a new one in a XVII century chinese town is given
in Yasutomi’s work [12]. More familiar to the reader may be similar events in the market
for tulips in the Netherlands, or the market for gold in more recent times. In all these
cases the acceptability of the good or currency may drop dramatically, without any deeper
reason than the fact that nobody considers them valuable any more. More quantifiable are
the values of currencies, where now, due to events that have taken place in this century,
the U.S. Dollar has become globally accepted. In that regards one should mention that
fluctuations in monetary value seem to exhibit fat tails [7,8], and long time fluctuations that
can be characterized by a Hurst exponent H ≈ 0.55 [7]. All these features are consistent
with our simple scenario. We stress that our model is schematic and does not include
any development of strategy by the agents, strategies which would naturally influence the
emergence of cooperativity [17,18].
Furthermore, the present version of the model does not include effects related to pro-
duction or consumption of goods. We have verified that the main result of including these
processes, is that products that are easily produced never become valuable. Thus, if all
goods are produced and consumed at a high rate, no common “money” will emerge. On
the other hand, if products are produced at a low rate the results presented above remain
valid, indicating again the robustness of the present model. In fact, the addition of a slow
production and consumption of goods allows the system to settle into a statistical stationary
state. This avoids products from falling, one by one, into the absorbing state consisting of
having the product present in the stock of all agents, and, consequently, being gradually
removed from the memories. As soon as such a product is removed from all memories, it is
effectively not anymore present in the economy. The effect of the decay mentioned above is
negligible in the time scale of the calculations presented in this work.
Finally we would like to emphasize that our work purports to model behavior in a social
setting where information exchange is a key feature. The fact that some forms of information
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exchange lead to self-organization has already been proposed by e.g. Bonabeau et al. [20].
There sociological hierarchies emerge through comparisons of a dominance index assigned
to each individual. Our model is more adapted for market behavior, in particular because
it also considers the exchange of goods, and not only of information. By emphasizing the
interplay between exchange of products and information, we have constructed a minimalistic
market model. However, since we explicitly require that our agents do not develop different
strategies, and that all the products can be exchanged only in a one-to-one manner, our
model may not give answers to some questions that may be adressed in more detailed
simulation models e.g. employing minority games [17], or the more elaborate models of
strategy and investments programs also existing in the economic literature, e.g. the one by
Kim and Markowitz [19].
In summary, we have constructed a simple model for the cooperative concept of money.
The model suggests that money emerges and collapses as a simple consequence of trade
of goods between interacting agents with memory. The concept of value arises from the
probability that a local dynamical pattern (the need for certain products by individual
agents) results in a global one (the general acceptability of products for exchange). An
important consequence, possibly valid for the dynamics of other large systems, is that a
tendency to draw information from previously encountered patterns may result in a dynamic
behavior that exhibits non-Gaussian fluctuations and persistency, evidenced by anomalous
Hurst exponents.
We thank Maya Paczuski and Dietrich Stauffer for constructive comments to the
manuscript. R.D. thanks Nordita for its hospitality and financial support during the time
that this work was performed.
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Figure Captions
• Fig. 1. Probability, measured as a percentage of the encounters between agents that
result in barter (full line) or money exchanges (dashed line), as defined in the text.
• Fig. 2. Number of agents M that consider a particular product as the most valuable
(a and b), and the maximum number of agents that, at a given time, consider the
same product as the most valuable (c).
• Fig. 3. (a) Probability of having changes in the value M as a function of their size,
for the three different time steps ∆t = 200000 (full line), ∆t = 20000 (long dashed
line), and ∆t = 2000 (short dashed line). (b) Probability of having changes in the
demand D. The demand is here measured in units of ∆D/∆tH , where ∆t takes the
values 200, 2000, and 20000 (three thin lines), and we took for the Hurst exponent the
value H = 0.7. The thick line depicts the normal probability distribution having the
same mean and standard deviation as that for ∆t = 200. The peaks near 0 observed
in the other distributions are attributed to border effects, arising from transitions near
D = 0.
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